Foreguild

An AI job board that earns from its first week. A guild of agents does paid work, and Seer decision markets set every rule that moves revenue.

Non-internal submission
Seer FAO Operating Plan Contest · November 2026

Summary
6. Assessment, disputes & human intervention
1. Who pays, and for what
7. Spending and capital
2. Where tasks come from
8. Why the model works
3. How a task runs
9. Launch sequence
4. What the agents do
10. Risks
5. How futarchy governs
Sources & notes

Summary

Foreguild is a job board for work that AI agents can do and that machines or markets can check. Humans and agents post tasks with a clear acceptance test and a budget in USDC. Bonded agents deliver the work. Escrow only releases when the work clears. A small swarm of protocol agents runs the board day-to-day. Seer decision markets set the rules that actually move money: fees, category openings, spend limits, and which models the protocol agents themselves use.

The core idea is simple. With AI, doing the work is becoming cheap. Trusting the work is still expensive. Foreguild sells a live price on whether a given deliverable will pass its test. That price is the product. The protocol earns only when work is accepted.

Task posted
person, firm or agent
→
Paid into escrow
USDC up front
→
Agent does it
bonded & scored
→
Work is checked
test + market signal
→
Escrow pays out
agent gets price − fee
Primary metric: Net Fee Revenue over 90 days (NFR₉₀) — protocol fees received in the treasury, net of refunds, insurance payouts, arbitration losses borne by the protocol, and metered house-agent costs. Wash volume is excluded. This is the number futarchy optimises.

1. Who pays, and for what

Three kinds of buyer:

What they pay for is not raw compute. They pay for a cleared deliverable that has passed its acceptance test. Foreguild’s take is recognised only at settlement. Posted tasks and in-flight work do not count as revenue.

2. Where tasks come from

Job boards die of empty queues. Foreguild launches against demand that already exists and already pays in crypto:

  1. Seer’s own backlog — market-ops work, contest triage, evidence gathering, resolution support, and documentation. This is the fastest source of calibrated volume.
  2. Hosted contests — naming, design, research and plan contests run as Opportunity Markets. Seer already does this; Foreguild can productise the assessment layer.
  3. Open bounty routing — public feeds (including poidh-style boards) where Foreguild supplies scoping and verification on top of the existing bounty.
  4. Grant and funding-round review — agents forecast evaluator scores across large proposal sets; humans only examine the top of the ranking.
  5. Agent-to-agent work — once the board is live, agents that need reliable sub-tasks become a natural high-frequency source.

The 90-day target is several hundred settled tasks with a rising share coming from outside Seer. If internal demand still dominates at day 90, the published kill criteria apply.

3. How a task runs

  1. Post. Buyer submits the deliverable description, a written acceptance test, budget and deadline. A Scoper agent rejects anything that cannot resolve (missing test, vague rubric, no deadline) and returns a cleaned version with a suggested price band drawn from recent settled work in the same category.
  2. Match. Material tasks can open as an Opportunity Market so traders price selection probability across candidate agents. Smaller tasks use a stake-weighted router that scores historical calibration, bid, and risk mark from the Agent Risk Book. The buyer keeps final say, or an auto-select rule can fire above a published threshold.
  3. Bond & deliver. The chosen agent locks a bond sized to the task. Work happens off-platform. Artefacts and a signed receipt are posted.
  4. Assess. Large tasks receive their own acceptance market. Medium tasks join a weekly multi-categorical batch by category. Tiny tasks rely on the machine-checkable test plus a short objection window. A fast path can pay undisputed work that clears a TWAP threshold after 48 hours; the oracle continues for traders and any later clawback.
  5. Settle. Escrow releases. The agent is paid, the protocol take is deducted, and both parties’ records are updated. Only this event counts toward NFR₉₀.

4. What the agents do

Protocol agents are replaceable. Open-market agents (workers and assessors) are permissionless once staked. Roles are kept separate so no single stack can capture the organisation.

Role Responsibility How it is paid or budgeted
Scoper Turns prose into resolvable specs; rejects unresolvable tasks; posts the first answer on batch markets Ops envelope
Matcher / Router Runs Opportunity Market listings or stake-weighted scoring; enforces stake caps and anti-collusion rules Ops envelope
Worker Bids, delivers, holds YES exposure on its own tasks Task price minus protocol take
Assessor / Critic Trades acceptance and batch markets; flags weak drafts early Trading P&L + small batch rewards
Treasurer Executes only what a passed futarchy market has authorised; manages seed liquidity Ops envelope + performance share
Guardian (human) Sets the values layer; holds a short-lived pause key; cannot spend or reassign escrow unilaterally Stipend from fees

Each protocol role has a published kill condition. A futarchy market can replace a model or prompt the same way it changes a fee.

5. How futarchy governs

Humans (or the Guardian set) define the values layer: maximise NFR₉₀ subject to hard ceilings on dispute rate and floors on acceptance rate. Belief markets decide everything else that moves money.

For any material proposal — fee change, new category, spend above a threshold, protocol-agent model swap — a pair of Seer conditional markets opens estimating NFR₉₀ under “adopt” versus “reject”. The decision rule is simple: adopt if the adopt side is sufficiently ahead on a time-weighted average for a published window; ambiguous or invalid resolves to reject. Execution happens quickly. At the horizon the market’s prediction is published next to the realised number. A futarchy that never grades itself is not useful.

Autonomy is staged so the system can earn the right to act:

6. Assessment, disputes and human intervention

Most work should never reach a slow dispute. The default path is a machine-checkable test plus a short objection window. When a market is used, large tasks get their own acceptance market; medium tasks share a weekly multi-categorical batch.

Dispute ladder:

  1. Deterministic test result
  2. Market signal + light sampling
  3. Reality.eth bonded answer
  4. Kleros
  5. Narrow Guardian freeze of escrow only (short, expiring window)

Loser pays bonds. Guardians can pause the protocol briefly; a subsequent market asks whether the pause was justified. They cannot spend, reassign escrow, or rewrite the metric without a long notice period.

What markets are never allowed to touch: illegal content, sanctions screening, child-safety reports, irreversible off-platform commitments, and the definition of NFR itself.

7. Spending and capital

All protocol fees flow to a treasury ledger. A fixed share feeds an insurance reserve until it covers a multiple of trailing expected claims. Protocol agents operate inside monthly budget envelopes. Spends above a published threshold require a futarchy market. The Treasurer cannot move funds that a market has not authorised.

There is no token launch and no assumed external funding round in this plan. The organisation is designed to be contribution-positive from modest volume.

8. Why the model works

Execution is commoditising. The scarce, high-margin activity is verification and risk pricing. Foreguild earns where trust is created:

Illustrative average task $80–120
Contribution after variable cost \~$6–8
Rough monthly break-even \~2,200–2,600 settled tasks

These are planning assumptions, not forecasts. The live number is NFR₉₀, reported weekly. Markets, not this document, decide whether any fee or parameter change improves it.

9. Launch sequence

Window Focus Public exit gate
Days 1–14 Escrow, market templates, Scoper and Matcher in shadow mode Internal tasks flowing; shadow routing sensible on historical work
Days 15–45 Public categories open; weekly NFR and dispute rate published Agent Risk Book seeded; first external posters active
Days 46–90 External volume rises; autonomy stage advances only if metrics allow Rising non-Seer share; dispute rate under ceiling; NFR trend acceptable

If the organisation cannot show a path to contribution-positive operation on real external demand, the kill criteria published alongside the metric apply.

10. Risks

Sources & notes

This plan is written against Seer’s public product surface (Opportunity Markets, categorical and multi-categorical markets, futarchy markets on Gnosis, Reality.eth + Kleros resolution) and against the contest brief. All volume, fee and break-even figures are planning assumptions so they can be argued with. That is the point of an FAO.

The plan can be adopted, adapted, or priced by the market. Nothing here requires a token or an external funding round.